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               Teache rs’ union s are form idable foe s of mean ingful edu cationa l reforms....
         The resulting frustration of long-ignored parents is manifesting itself in the 
         profusion of charter an d for-profit schools.
Charlene K. Haar (1998)
I.  Introduction.
The “little red school house” was once a powerful metaphor for public perceptions and
views of public schools in the United States: small schools founded on a strong consensus of both
purpose and means; supported by strong communities of active, concerned parents; attended by eager,
disciplined children; and taught by hard-working, dedicated teachers.  Whether or not perception ever
fully matched reality, public perceptions are now very different and have been for several decades. 
National surveys “...depict an American public angered by their perceptions of the state of public
education.  Many see the schools as mirroring the moral decay that infects society.  The public feels the
schools are no longer theirs, that they have been captured by teachers, reformers, unions, or others.” 
(Wadsworth, 1997)  
Some of the strongest attacks are reserved for teachers’ unions, with recent evidence that unions
increase costs while increasing high-school dropout rates (Hoxby, 1996) and claims that contracts and
unions impede both school performance and reform initiatives (Raham, 1999).  Discontent with public
schools in general and teachers’ unions in particular has fueled interest in a variety of reforms: vouchers,
charter schools, teacher “pay for performance” plans, and a myriad of school accountability proposals
and initiatives.1   Indeed, the spirit of “reform” has been so contagious that even the teachers’ unions
have been taken up by the inertia of reform, with calls by Robert Chase, President of the National
Education Association, for a “New Unionism” based upon collaborative bargaining with school districts
to help improve the performance of schools.  Most recently, President Bush and Congress (including an
unlikely ally, Senator Ted Kennedy) have joined forces to enact a federal reform initiative. 
2But what do we really know?  Do teachers’ unions lower student performance?  Are “pay for
performance” plans for teachers a good idea?  What kinds of plans have been tried, and what is the
evidence on how well they work?  What about private-school alternatives?  Are private schools really
better than public schools, as many believe?  If so, then voucher or tuition assistance programs might be
successful in improving student achievement by shifting students from public to private schools.  If not,
then will school voucher programs simply further segregate students by the socio-economic factors of
education, income, and race?  What about the rapidly growing charter school movement?  Are these
schools more effective alternatives for students in the public schools?  What good evidence do we have? 
In our contribution to this volume, we review the evidence on the effects of teachers’ unions on
public schools.  Much of this evidence will be discomforting to critics of teachers’ unions; other evidence
discomforting to teachers’ unions.  In the end, though, we seek to identify concrete issues about the
interaction of schools and teachers’ unions that may help focus efforts at improving schools.  Next, we
survey key trends in the “standards and accountability” movement, along with evidence on their
effectiveness; review the evidence on “pay for performance” or “incentive pay” plans; evaluate the
evidence on the relative effectiveness of public versus private- and charter-school alternatives, as well as
voucher and plans designed to encourage alternatives; discuss the relationship between these issues and
the recent federal education reform act; and consider the NEA’s move toward a “New Unionism.”  We
conclude with a summary of key findings and a discussion of future direct ions for reform.
II.  Collective Bargaining and Outcomes.
What evidence is available to assess the concrete effects of teachers’ unions on public schools? 
Where evidence is available, what are the most reliable conclusions one can draw?  Other reviews of
teachers’ unions often ask related, but different questions that emphasize the institutional context,
evolution, and operation of collective bargaining in public schools.  Two prominent examples of this
genre are Teacher Unions in Schools (Johnson, 1984) and The Changing Idea of a Teachers’ Unions
2Kleiner an d Petree, 1 988 find o nly a small differen tial, but rely on agg regate data  with few contro ls. 
3
(Kerchner and Mitchell, 1988).  Indeed, other contributions to this volume offer related perspectives.
Our point of departure here relies heavily on Unions and Public Schools (Eberts and Stone,
1984) and a recent critical survey by Stone (2000).  The latter poses the following conjecture: Suppose
we had no direct evidence on the influence of teachers’ unions, but instead had only the indirect
implications from the effects of unions elsewhere, whether in private industry or other portions of the
public sector.  What might we expect, based only on the patterns found for unions elsewhere, about the
effects of teachers’ unions?  The typical effects of unions, as reviewed for example in the classic What
Do Unions Do? (Freeman and Medoff, 1984), offer a sharp perspective on the likely effects of teachers’
unions on teacher pay and benefits, working conditions, cost of instruction, and student achievement. 
Teacher pay and benefits
Unions want “more,” said Samuel Gompers.  In sectors other than public schools, evidence
suggests that pay and fringe benefits for union workers typically exceed those of non-union workers. 
While the magnitude of the differential can vary substantially from one sector to another, the pay
differential is typically 8 to 10 percent for “identical” workers and even higher for fringe benefits
(Freeman and Medoff, 1984, pp. 47, 67-8).  To the extent that teachers’ unions are similar to those
elsewhere, we would expect similar pay and fringe benefit differentials for unionized teachers.  
Two detailed studies (Baugh and Stone, 1982; and Hoxby, 1996) using different techniques and
sample data find evidence that, indeed, unionized teachers do tend to earn more, in the range of 5 to 12
percent.2  The range of this pay premium is consistent with the typical range found for union pay premia
in other sectors.  While evidence on the pay premium is more extensive than on the fringe-benefit
premium, Eberts and Stone (1984, p. 146) do present evidence on fringe benefits for one state.  Based
upon contracts for New York public schools, they find a significantly positive effect for fringe benefits
for teachers, one substantially larger than for the corresponding effect on pay.  This result corresponds to
4evidence from other sectors, where the effect on fringe benefits is typically larger than the effect on pay. 
Working conditions
Unions typically push for improvements in working conditions for their workers, but also often
push to “standardize” the workplace.  While there are many studies of workplace conditions and
processes for public schools and teachers’ unions, there are few controlled studies that permit reliable
comparisons between unionized and nonunionized schools.  For working conditions, three studies offer
some evidence.  Eberts and Stone (1984) rely on national data from the Sustaining Effects Survey of
elementary schools to study both the student-teacher ratio and the amount of paid preparation time for
teachers.  The student-teacher ratio is nearly 12 percent lower and the amount of paid preparation time is
about 4 percent greater for unionized teachers.  Kleiner and Petree (1988, p. 316) use state-level data and
also find a decline (7 percent) in student-teacher ratios for unionized teachers.  Similarly, Hoxby (1996,
p. 695) uses district-level data and finds a decline of about 9 percent in her preferred specification.  
Along with improvements in working conditions, unions also tend to “standardize” the
workplace, as well.  Eberts and Stone (1984, p. 149) examine detailed contract items for districts in New
York and find a greater reliance in unionized schools on traditional classroom organization, as compared
to other instructional methods.  In national data for fourth-grade students Eberts and Stone (p. 156) also
find that unionized schools are less likely to rely on a variety of specialized, more idiosyncratic
instructional methods in mathematics: 42 percent less time with a specialist, 62 percent less with a
specialized aid, 26 percent less time with a tutor, and 68 percent less time in independent, programmed
study.  As we will suggest later, these kinds of standardizations, common to unionized workplaces, may
have substantial consequences for atypical students, in ways that are different from those for  average
students.   
Unions and their members are certainly interested, too, in protecting employment, either from
temporary downturns in enrollment or from incentives to reduce employment as the costs of union pay
3 Labor restrictions are normally required for “efficient” contracts, as in (McDonald and Solow, 1981).
4In some exceptional cases, total costs of unionized production are lower at very large scales of integrated
operations (e.g., as found by Allen, 1986, in construction and Wilson et al, 1995, in sawmills).
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and fringe benefits rise.3  Student-teacher ratios tend to be lower in unionized schools, even in the face of
higher pay and more costly fringe benefits, and the two major types of contract items that tend to protect
teachers from employment loss are class-size limitations and reductions-in-force (RIF) provisions. 
Eberts and Stone (1984, pp. 143-44) find that these two types of provisions tend to increase employment
and the total cost of instruction above what it otherwise would be.
Cost of instruction
Increased pay, better fringe benefits, improved working conditions, a more standardized and
regulated workplace, and the kinds of protection against loss of employment common in union contracts
typically come at the expense of a higher cost of production in other unionized sectors.4  To what extent
is this true for teachers’ unions?  The answer, while appearing obvious, is potentially complex, since the
more attractive employment compensation and environment might attract more able teachers, offsetting
at least to some extent the higher costs with better teaching and higher levels of student achievement.
While a few early studies (e.g., Hall and Carroll, 1975; Chambers 1977) find little or no difference in the
costs of operating unionized schools, the two most detailed studies provide quite consistent evidence of
higher operating costs.  Eberts and Stone (1986) find that the cost of operating unionized elementary
schools is about 15 percent higher; the cost of unionized high schools about 8 percent higher.  Similarly,
Hoxby (1996) relies on different, more recent data and finds a union cost differential of about 12 percent.
Student achievement
The question the public is most concerned with, of course, is whether teachers’ unions affect
student achievement.  For this question, evidence on “productivity” from other sectors is mixed.  For
some
5Studies of unions and productivity include Pencavel (1977) for British coal fields, Clark (1980a, 1980b)
for cement producers, Ehrenberg et al (1983) for municipal libraries, Allen (1986) for school and office
construction, and M itchell and Stone (1992 ) for western U.S. sawmills.
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sectors, unionized workers appear to be more productive, in others less.  In most cases, though, the
differences, one way or the other, are modest, especially in the most controlled studies.5  Indeed, we
argue that the evidence suggests that the critical conclusion is not whether or not the overall effect of
teachers’ unions on student achievement is positive or negative, but the more specific ways in which
teachers’ unions appear to influence the effectiveness of schools.
What is the evidence for student achievement?  The ideal experiment is not available.  One
would like to randomly assign students to schools that are also randomly assigned to union or nonunion
status, and then observe student achievement over time.  The best approximations to this ideal
experiment employ extensive control variables for both student and school attributes, as well as controls
for the nonrandom assignment of students and schools.  Despite numerous studies of teachers’ unions
and student achievement, even good approximations to the ideal experiment have been difficult to
achieve.
Often, the most widely reported evidence is based upon state-level data for SAT or ACT scores,
with relatively few detailed student controls.  Two prominent state-level studies are Kleiner and Petree
(1988) and Nelson and Rosen (1996), who find roughly similar positive effects for teachers’ unions on
either average SAT or ACT scores at the state level – between 4.5 and 8 percent.   Kleiner and Petree
also find a positive effect on high-school graduation rates of roughly the same magnitude (4.4 percent).
A few studies have used individual student data with relatively detailed controls for both student
and school attributes to look at student achievement.  These include Eberts and Stone (1987), Milkman
(1989, 1997), Grimes and Register (1990), and Argys and Rees (1995).  Across four different samples of
students (the Sustaining Effects Survey, High School and Beyond, the National Assessment of Economic
Education, and the National Educational Longitudinal Survey) and three different grade levels (fourth,
7tenth and twelfth), these studies yield remarkably consistent results.  Collectively, they find statistically
significant, positive effects of teachers’ union on average student scores on various standardized exams
of between 1.0 and 2.0 percent.  Given the divergences in samples, grade levels, test measures, and
empirical methodologies, the congruence of these findings is impressive.
Hoxby (1996), though, finds negative effects for teachers’ unions.  Based on school-district level
data for high-school drop-out rates, this study finds that teachers’ unions are associated with a 2.3 percent
increase in student drop-out rates, and infers that unionization reduces student achievement.   Hoxby also
explores whether or not these effects on drop-out rates are increased by a lack of competition among
local school districts.  Interacting a Herfindahl measure of school-district concentration with union status,
she finds that union effects on the drop-out rate are larger in areas with little inter-district competition. 
The study is relatively well controlled, so this “competition” result appears especially powerful.
Hoxby’s results raise the question of how teachers’ unions can raise measures of average student
achievement on standardized exams yet also increase high-school drop-out rates.  One simple answer, of
course, might be that low-scoring students are more likely to drop out, so that relatively higher scoring
students remain to take the tests.  While this answer might be a factor, it is not a very satisfactory answer
for the positive achievement results found in much earlier grades (in this case, fourth grade), where the
drop-out rates are much lower and the achievements results are still similar to those for high school.
We believe that a more satisfactory answer lies in the evidence on the effect of teachers’ unions
on the distribution of student achievement, rather than on average student achievement.  Eberts and Stone
(1984) and Milkman (1989) both find an inverted-U shape for the effects of teachers’ unions on student
achievement.  The effects are modestly positive for average students, but negative for atypical students in
the upper- and lower-tails of the distribution of pre-test scores.
This pattern may help to reconcile the evidence of positive effects on achievement for  average
students with negative effects on high-school drop-out rates.  We know that drop-out rates are very
6Even within the traditional organization of classroom instruction, the use of hourly tutors with selected
students improves student performance, especially among disadvantaged students (e.g., Farkas, 1993).
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highly correlated with student success in schools, and that low performing students are much more likely
to drop out.  If teachers’ union tend to reduce the academic success of weak students, then one would
also tend to expect an increase in the drop-out rate, since the weakest students are the most likely to drop
out.
But what explains the differential effects across levels of student ability?  Part of the answer
appears to be related to our earlier discussion of the standardizing effect of teachers’ unions on schools. 
We know that unionized schools rely to a greater extent on traditional classroom instruction, less on a
variety of specialized modes of instruction.  Since standard methods are likely to work best for the
“norm” (or average student) and specialized modes best for atypical students, one might expect the
pattern of differential effects found across levels of student ability.6  This explanation is reinforced by
Argys and Rees, who find that these differential effects are no longer significant after one controls for the
type and size of the instructional setting and other related class factors.  
This conclusion seems to offer a more pragmatic, even optimistic, direction to explore in
understanding and responding to the differential patterns for student achievement in effects of unionized
and nonunionized schools.  For student achievement, it may be relatively more important for unionized
schools to pay particular attention to the diversity of instructional settings for atypical students; and for
nonunionized schools to pay particular attention to average class sizes.  This conclusion is reinforced by
the consistent evidence in the Eberts-Stone, Milkman and Hoxby studies that reductions in class sizes are
more effective in nonunionized schools, as well as by evidence in the Argys-Rees study that use of more
specialized instructional modes would be effective for low- and high-ability students in unionized
schools.
III.  Reform Initiatives
9By many accounts the release in 1983 of the report A Nation at Risk, prepared by the National
Commission on Excellence in Education, marked the beginning of the current, sustained wave of
educational reform.  Teachers, who before that time had enjoyed a rather obscure place in the eyes of the
public, suddenly found themselves at center stage in the controversy over poor student performance.  The
immediate response to the report was to set up systems to improve the accountability of teachers and
schools.  For many, the focus was on monitoring and assessing teacher practices and tying compensation
to their performance.  For the two decades prior to the reform, these issues had become the prerogative
for teacher collective bargaining.  Since Wisconsin first allowed teachers to bargain collectively in 1962,
teachers’ unions across the nation had sought to establish a “web of rules” that regulated the activities of
teachers, defined their rights and duties to particular assignments, governed the evaluation process,
determined class size, and of course negotiated compensation.  Thus, in many respects, the reform
movement collided head on with the union movement, which by the early 1980s included nearly two-
thirds of the nation’s public school teachers.  
The first waves of reform initiatives were not widely embraced by teachers’ unions.  McDonnell
and Pascal (1988), in studying the role of unions in implementing reform, provide evidence that the
bargaining process continued to place material gain, such as higher salaries and benefits and better
working conditions, over efforts to increase teacher professionalism and accountability.  Johnson and
Kardos (2000) also document the stance of teachers’ unions in supporting and implementing reform
efforts and conclude that many unions tried to stall the initial reform process in the belief that the public
would soon lose interest.  Union organizations have found, however, that the public has not lost interest,
and in many respects they have called for more sweeping reform, such as vouchers and charter schools,
that could attack the very existence of public schools and thus the existence of teachers’ unions.  
In an address a few years ago at the National Press Club, the president of the National Education
Association, Robert Chase, reminded his nearly 2 million teacher members of the need to recognize that
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the educational system must be reformed and unions must take an active role in planning new strategies
and implementing them:
7Robert Chase, President, NEA, National Press Club,  February 5, 1997, Washington, D.C.
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“The imperative now facing public education could not be more stark: Simply put, in the
  decade ahead, we must revitalize our public schools from within, or they will be dismantled
  from without. …The vast majority of Americans …want higher quality public schools, and 
  they want them now.  Our challenge is clear: Instead of relegating teachers to the role of
  production workers – with no say in organizing their schools for excellence – we need to 
  enlist teache rs as full partn ers, indeed , as co-m anage rs of their scho ols.  Instead  of contrac ts
  that reduc e flexibility and  restrict chan ge, we – a nd our sc hools – n eed con tracts that 
  empow er and en able.” 7 
In the following sections, we describe three types of reform initiatives – accountability, incentive pay,
and school choice.  These have gained considerable support among policy makers and been implemented
to varying degrees across the country.  We focus on evidence of their effectiveness in improving student
outcomes, in particular test scores, as well as the stance and role of teachers’ unions in the reform efforts. 
Accountability
Reforms to improve the accountability of schools have taken two primary directions.  The first
has sought to improve the existing system by implementing changes that directly affect the internal
operations of schools.  Chief among these are efforts to establish standards for student performance,
measurement tools to track their progress, and prescribed consequences for students, teachers, and
schools.  The second type of accountability goes outside the public schools and enhances parental choice
of schools in an effort to put added competitive pressure on schools to improve.  This wave of reform has
resulted in a number of different voucher programs, making the cost to parents of sending their children
to private schools more comparable to that of public schools.  It has also resulted in publicly supported
“charter” schools outside the direct control of local school boards as additional alternatives to
conventional public schools.  
Central to both types of initiatives has been the need to assess the performance of students and
thus the progress of  schools.  The Nation-at-Risk report raised the public’s awareness of the importance
of outcomes over process.  Prior to the report, the focus had been primarily on the number of students
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attending school or the dollars spent per child.  After the report appeared, the public increasingly wanted
to know the quality of the schooling.  Were students learning to read and write at an acceptable grade
level, were they mastering basic quantitative skills, were they taught problem-solving skills, and were
they properly prepared to find a job immediately after graduation or to go on to college?  To make these
assessments, tests have been proposed and implemented to measure a student’s academic progress. 
Testing, of course, is not new to American schools, but what is new is the standardization of tests, along
with more prominent roles for the state and federal government, in devising and administering the tests.  
Today, nearly every state has implemented a school accountability program with the help and
encouragement of the federal government.  According to a recent study by Betts and Danenberg (2002),
these programs are based upon three elements: 1) content standards that mandate what a student should
know and when they should now it, 2) an assessment system that tracks the progress of students vis a vis
the state standards, and 3) a set of responses by the state that may include financial incentives, penalties,
sanctions, or additional resources.  
Betts and Danenberg offer a list of arguments typically put forth by proponents and critics of
these programs.  Those who favor such a system argue that making school performance more transparent
to the public and especially to parents can put needed pressure on schools to perform better.  Proponents
claim that schools will be forced to improve their operations and teachers will be more productive when
presented with well-defined goals and are held accountable to these goals through the close scrutiny of
their adherence to the goals and a carefully designed system of consequences.
Critics point out that state-level standards may be unfair to both affluent districts with high
expectations for their students and low-income districts that lack adequate school- and home-based
resources to adequately meet the needs of the students.  For instance, they argue that imposing one
standard on all students and imposing sanctions on districts that do not meet this standard and rewarding
districts that do may divert resources from the poor districts, which need the additional resources, to
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affluent districts, which don’t.  A somewhat related concern is that the state will be slow in adjusting
these standards in response to changing times or the specific needs of selected school districts.  Critics
are also concerned about the assessment system.  They believe that teachers will tend to “teach to the
test” and focus their instruction on the narrower content covered on tests, rather than offer broader topics
and more in-depth treatment of the subject matter.
At first blush, teachers’ unions should find standards-based systems attractive because they
promote the standardization of the workplace.  With clearly defined goals and objectives and mandates to
adhere to these standards, teachers understand what is expected of them, they are protected from 
capricious directives from building administrators that may distract them from these goals, and they can
relate negotiated contract provisions, such as class size reduction, to accomplishing these standards.  On
the other, standards-based accountability intrudes into the teacher’s autonomy in the classroom.  It
dictates the curricula that the teacher should follow, the tests that they should administer, and establishes
the outcomes that are expected.  The first two items – curricula and testing – have been outside the
immediate discretion of teachers, although teachers do participate in their design and implementation. 
Being held accountable for student outcomes, however, is the major point of contention.  Teachers
believe that it can expose them to arbitrary treatment by administrators, makes them responsible for
things outside their immediate control, and bases compensation on ambiguous criteria (Johnson and
Kardos, 2000).   
States have established standards-based accountability systems more on principle and promise
than on any evidence of their effectiveness.  Although some states have had these systems in place for
more than a decade, evaluations of the effectiveness of these systems are not that common and those that
have been attempted offer at best preliminary results.  School-based performance systems have been
adopted by districts in a number of states.   For example, districts in Kentucky and South Carolina have
implemented a system in which high-performance schools receive additional revenue that can be used at
8Private sector businesses reward workers more through promotions and group-based merit systems, such as
gain-sharing or profit-sharing, than through individual merit rewards (Prendergast, 1999).  See Kruse (1993) for a
study of the effects o f profit-sharing in p rivate industry.
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the schools’ discretion, including in some cases offering additional compensation to teachers.  Clotfelter
and Ladd (1996) analyze Dallas’ performance-based system and find an increase of 10 to 12 percent in
the pass rate on selected state-wide tests.  Unfortunately, the study does not use a true control group, and
there is a similar rate of improvement in the year prior to the implementation of the performance-based
system.8   
One of the most careful analyses of such programs is the Betts and Danenberg evaluation of
California’s recently adopted school accountability program.  The program, enacted in 1999, was based
on highly specific and comprehensive standards, a new norm-referenced statewide test and a high school
exit exam, and a complex series of rewards and punishments for school staff and students.   The study
analyzes recent trends in both the level and distribution of test scores and school resources.  They
consider two trends to be particularly important: test scores have risen significantly since the
implementation of the accountability program while teacher resources have declined.  They further
emphasize that these trends are particularly evident for the lowest performing schools.  Betts and
Danenberg interpret these results to suggest that accountability reforms and public scrutiny spurred
genuine achievement growth (p. 42).  They also recognize that the patterns are consistent with teaching to
the test or a growing familiarity with the tests and testing process, possibilities that detract from the
success of the program.  Nonetheless, they find that testing and related aspects of accountability have not
diluted the high school curriculum, nor has it widened inequality in the curriculum between top- and
bottom-performing schools (p. 41).  
Incentive pay
One widely accepted approach to achieving accountability is to link teacher compensation to
student outcomes.  Until the time of the reform initiatives in the mid-1980s, collective bargaining had
9Indeed, many have argued that one of the major reasons that teachers supported union representation was
to take the compensa tion decisions out of the hands of ad ministrators.
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sought to treat teachers equally.  With few exceptions, teachers with the same years of experience and the
same educational attainment were given the same level of compensation.  There was little differentiation
between the performance or ability of teachers.  Many collective bargaining contracts did not allow
administrators to distinguish between teachers according to their performance, and they did not even
allow peer review.  Therefore, the notion of incentive pay for teachers was antithetical to unions.9
Nonetheless, incentive pay has been introduced in several unionized districts, but most of these
attempts were short-lived.  Even if unions offered their wholehearted support to such a scheme, there are
several aspects of the educational process that make it difficult to implement a successful pay-for-
performance system for individual teachers.   Advocates of incentive-based schemes to reform public
schools often refer to the private sector as an example of individual performance-based compensation
systems and as one that schools should emulate.  Yet, even the simplest incentive models are subject to
problems, and evidence reveals that only a small proportion of jobs in the private sector base
compensation on explicit contracts that reward individual behavior (e.g., Lawler, 1983).  The simple,
static principal-agent model that Prendergast (1999) postulates rewards agents for taking on additional
risk through a pay-for-performance contract with higher (mean) wages.  In her model, the performance
measures used are noisy and the efficacy of the incentives depends on the risk aversion of the agents.  
It is widely recognized that “incentives” may result in unintended, sometimes perverse,
consequences.  Prendergast uses the term “dysfunctional behavioral responses”; Murnane and Cohen
(1986) “opportunistic behavior.”  Institutional factors that may result in such dysfunctional responses
include poorly defined or poorly measured outcomes, leading to a reliance on subjective evaluations that
may be flawed; multi-tasking,; team production; and multiple stakeholders.  Subjective evaluations may
be flawed because evaluators may be subject to “moral hazard” issues, individuals may engage in non-
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productive activities to curry favor with their evaluators, or evaluators may end up with distributions of
ratings that are compressed due to a reluctance to give very high or low ratings (Prendergast, 1999).   
10Here, we r ely heavily on ar guments also  presented  in Murna ne and C ohen (19 86).  Dixit’s (1 999) an alysis
of incentives in education also coincides closely with ours.  He suggests four complications in educational settings
that confound the simple “principal-agent” model of implicit contracting: multiple goals, multiple principals, lack of
compe tition in the prod uct market, an d agents mo tivated by intrinsic  values. 
11Murnane and  Cohen (198 6) also emphasize the sho rt-lived nature of merit pay systems.
17
Four constraints that may reduce the effectiveness of incentive-based compensation appear to
characterize the teaching and learning process of schools.10  These are: 1) the reliance on subjectively
measured outcomes, 2) the need to perform multiple tasks during the course of the day, 3) the use of team
teaching where more than one teacher is responsible for the outcome of student or classroom, and 4) the
existence of multiple stakeholders with diverse objectives. 
Empirical evidence clearly documents that people respond to incentives, but there may be several
wedges between performance measures and the actions of teachers that tend to mitigate against
individual level, incentive-based compensation schemes – just as they often do in the private sector.  The
net result of these forces remains an empirical issue.  Yet, little empirical evidence examines the effects
of merit pay on student achievement.  Most of the literature on merit pay systems documents the
institutional experiences in districts – for the most part, rather short-lived and usually negative.  For
example, a major study of merit-based pay (Hatry, Greiner, and Ashford; 1994) find that most (75
percent) merit pay programs in existence as of 1983, were no longer operational in 1993.11  An
interesting self-described limitation of the Hatry et al. (1994) study is that they do not examine student
achievement.  They note,
We would especially have liked to have performed an in-depth analysis of the impact of
incentive p rogram s on stude nt achiev ement.  H owever , very few of th e participa ting districts
had attempted any systematic evaluation of the effects of their incentive plans on student
achievement, even though a basic assumption behind incentive plans is that teachers can
indeed sig nificantly a ffect learning .  (pp. 7–8).
In one Pennsylvania district, Tulli (1991) finds no gains in student achievement from a bonus system.
12Unfortuna tely, the data on ly refer to cours e-related infor mation such  as grades an d daily attend ance, with
no informa tion about the  students othe r than ID nu mber. 
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In related work, we have studied one high school that implemented a merit pay system in 1996
and a “comparable” high school that  maintained a traditional system.12  Community High School, which
implemented the merit pay system, is an alternative education facility that has an enrollment of
approximately 500 students pursuing a high school diploma and 100 students pursuing other
certifications.  These students often do not succeed in traditional settings and usually experience
problems with attendance and retention.  Consequently, the performance-based incentives were targeted
on student retention. The detailed results are found in Eberts, Hollenbeck, and Stone (forthcoming).  
These results, based on “difference-in difference” analysis that controls for extraneous factors,
showed that incentives worked, but that a misalignment of incentives with desired goals can yield
unintended results.  We find that students attending the high school with the pay-for-performance system
had a higher retention rate but a lower course completion rate than those in the comparison high school. 
The administrators who set up the system also expected that grades and average daily attendance would
increase, but results reveal no difference in these two measures vis-a-vis the comparison group.
School choice
Private school experience
A chief motivation for interest in various programs of school choice is the belief that private
schools are more effective in educating students than public schools, and thus they offer a viable
alternative to parents and a serious competitive threat to public schools.  Basic empirical evidence would
seem to support this belief.  Private-school students score higher on average on standardized academic
tests and are more likely to graduate from high school and attend college than public-school students. 
However, private-school students and their families differ in important ways from public-school students,
so it is difficult to determine whether the differentials arise from differences in the schools or from
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differences in the students who attend the schools.  Is it the schools or the students?  If it is primarily the
schools, then expanded programs of school choice might offer opportunities for improved student
performance.  If it is primarily the students, then expanded school choice might further exacerbate
student segmentation along income, ability, education, and racial lines – without any real improvements
in student performance.  
We do know from a number of studies (e.g., Figlio and Stone, 2000) that private-school students
are disproportionately high-income, high-SES and high ability, as well as disproportionately white.  We
also know from the Figlio-Stone study that local- and school-level policy variables can influence the
segmentation of students between private and public schools.  Controlling for local crime rates, increased
inter-district competition within the public sector, and lower student-teacher ratios all are powerful forces
in holding students in the public sector and lowering relative enrollments in local private schools.  For
example, a number of state initatives in school-finance related issues – such as tax limitation measures
and, perhaps surprisingly, “equalizing” school-finance reforms – tend to lead to increased student-teacher
ratios (Figlio 1997, 1998).  Thus, the wave of various school-finance related initiatives in many states
could lead to even greater segmentation between public and private schools, in terms of income, ability,
education, and race.  Indeed, Downes and Greenstein (1996) find evidence of substantial new private-
school entry during the period immediately following California’s Proposition 13 tax limitation measure
and the Serrano court decision equalizing school spending. 
Beyond the question of the extent to which various school-choice programs might exacerbate
current trends toward segmentation of students along income, education, ability, and racial lines, there
remains the question of whether it is the students or the schools that explain the differences in the
performance of private- and public-school students.  Here, the most detailed studies, appear to offer
increasingly consistent evidence.  With careful controls for the initial sorting of students into private and
public schools, a number of recent studies find little or no difference in the performance of students in
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the two sets of schools.  Based on a nationally representative sample of over 12,000 students, for
example, Figlio and Stone (1999) find a positive performance differential for private schools only for the
probability of two years of college attendance (and the selectivity of the college attended), with no
significant differences overall in the performance on standardized tests.  Only for a few subgroups do
they find that private-school students outperform public-school students, after correcting for the
nonrandom selection of students into the two sectors.  Notable among these exceptions, though, are
African-American youths attending private schools in very large urban areas.  
These findings are consistent with a number of other recent, well controlled studies, including
Neal’s (1997) finding that Catholic schools particularly benefit urban minorities, Rouse’s (1998) finding
of a modestly positive differential for private schools in her analysis of the Milwaukee school-choice
experiment, and recent evidence by Howell et al (2000) that reported the effects of school vouchers on
student test scores in three large cities with concentrations of minorities.  The report found that no
students, other than African-Americans, appeared to benefit from the voucher experiments.  With this
evidence in mind, we now turn more directly to the issues and evidence related to various forms of
school choice.
School-choice experiments
By tradition and culture, Americans tend to place tremendous trust in the power of choice.  Most
subscribe to the notion that an efficient market economy is based on the ability of each consumer to
freely choose the goods and services that best meet their preferences at the lowest possible price.  If this
belief is truly ingrained in the minds of American families, then why hasn’t it extended to K-12
education?  Why haven’t taxpayers insisted that government simply give each family a voucher to pay for
education at any school that they choose?  For school reformers who have touted vouchers as the next
great innovation to improve the U.S. educational system, and there are many who hold this view, the
inability to gain widespread support from voters for such a reform is perplexing.  
13A recent P hi Delta K appa/G allup poll sho wed that 52  percent of p arents who se nd their childr en to pub lic
schools sup port pro posals to allo w school ch oice, such as  vouchers.    
14Florida ha s initiated a tax-cre dit for up to 2 5 percen t of educatio nal expense s that exceed  $250 p er child.  
21
The most recent reminder of this paradox was the sound defeat of two major state referenda to
permit states to use public dollars to fund vouchers.  California’s proposal to give each of its 6 million
school-age children a $4,000 voucher was defeated by 70 percent to 30 percent.  Michigan’s more limited
scheme to give vouchers of up to $3,300 to students in districts designated by the state as failing was also
defeated by the same wide margin.  In many ways these two attempts to implement a statewide publicly
funded voucher system are the culmination of a decade of experimentation with both public and private
voucher schemes.  The defeat of the two state ballot measures may arise in part from the lack of a
consensus on the effects of the various manifestations of school-choice initiatives on student
achievement.13 
Educational reform based upon school choice has taken two major forms in the past decade.  The
first approach is to offer vouchers worth up to a fixed limit that can be used to pay for tuition at a private
school.  The first public voucher program was initiated in Milwaukee in 1990.  The program initially
offered vouchers of about $2,500 to 1 percent of the Milwaukee Public School’s students, or about 1,000
low-income children.  About a third of those receiving vouchers used them to attend private schools. 
Choice was limited to non-religious private schools.  In 1995, the enrollment cap was raised to 7 percent,
and religious-affiliated schools were allowed to participate.  By the end of the decade, nearly 6,000
students used their vouchers to attend non-public schools.  Since then, the Cleveland Public School
System and the state of Florida have implemented  similar programs.14  Voucher programs have also been
initiated by private groups.  One compilation of privately funded scholarship programs reports that in
2001 nearly 100 such programs have given tuition grants to more than 50,000 students (Garrett, 2001).
Charter schools are another form of school choice, although more limited in scope of choice than
15Milton Friedman, one of the first in the modern era to advocate wide-spread vouchers for education,
reiterates these points in a recent article “The Next Big Free-Market Thing,” published in the Wall Street Journal,
July 9, 1998.  Others who have written extensively in favor of vouchers and school choice include Chubb and Moe
(1990 ) and Hill, P ierce, and G uthrie (199 7).     
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the voucher programs.  Charter schools are public schools chartered by the state that receive public
funds, typically based upon enrollment.  The governance and regulations of charter schools vary by state. 
In place of an elected school board, most charter schools are governed by a separate body, which is
typically not elected by the public.  In some states, such as Michigan, they are appointed by the
chartering agency and not even elected by the parents.  In many but not all states, teachers must be
certified and the board members are considered public officials accountable to state laws and regulations. 
Most charter schools are not allowed to charge tuition, but can raise money from foundations and other
sources, excluding the families of the students.  Since Minnesota passed the first charter school law in
1991, more than 2,000 charters have been established in 30 states with over 500,000 students.  Arizona,
California, and Michigan account for over 40 percent of the schools and 50 percent of the students.   
  In arguing the merits  of school choice, proponents argue that private schools are more effective
in meeting student needs, in part because they are not encumbered by government bureaucracy and
political pressures.  Proponents also cite open competition for students as a means of sparking new
innovations and customizing educational curricula and experiences to meet the needs of different
students.  They also see school choice as returning control of a student’s education to parents.15 
Opponents, on the other hand, argue that perceived effectiveness of private schools over conventional
public schools results not from the greater effectiveness of the private schools themselves, but in their
ability to attract more motivated students from higher-income families.  In their view, conventional
schools can be improved from within, and these school  improvement initiatives are well underway.  As
public schools reduce class size, restructure district-level governance, and customize services, many
opponents see open competition through school choice as disruptive to these efforts and as counter
16These results are summ arized from the study by G ill, et al. (2001), which provides the mo st
compre hensive and  objective e valuation of the  effects of vouc hers and ch arter schoo ls to date.  
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productive.
The verdict on school choice should rest with the empirical evidence.  Not surprisingly, surveys
report that parents who use vouchers to send their student to a school of choice are highly satisfied with
their choice.  There is also evidence that vouchers increase the access of  low-income, low-achieving, and
minority students to voucher schools.  Nevertheless, access of students with disabilities and those with
poorly educated parents has not improved as much.  Similarly, vouchers are shown to play only a  modest
role in increasing racial integration, and this takes place primarily in highly segregated communities. 
Despite these positive effects, the evidence to date on student achievement is inconclusive.16  
The Milwaukee voucher program has received the most scrutiny in terms of evaluating its effect
on student achievement.  Three major studies have been conducted, each drawing somewhat different
conclusions.  One study finds no effect, another finds that students who attended nonpublic schools
attained higher scores on both math and reading, and a third study finds that voucher students did better
in math but not in reading.  The obvious question is how can three groups of evaluators looking at the
same program come up with different findings as to their effectiveness.  The essential difference in these
studies rests with the group of students that the evaluators use to compare outcomes with those who
actually used the voucher to enroll in an alternative school.  Valid evaluations of such programs require
that the outcomes of those who use the vouchers to attend an alternative school be compared with
otherwise identical students in the public schools.  
As with the evaluation of union-nonunion different in student achievement, the ideal evaluation
would randomly assign students to one kind of school with another.  Unfortunately, this is not strictly
possible for either the union-nonunion question or the school choice issue.  The best that one can
typically do is to find a group that has the same characteristics, including socioeconomic and other
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factors, that might lead to different levels of motivation and family support.  The most widely accepted
methodology is to take advantage of situations in which voucher programs cannot accommodate all those
who apply, and thus a lottery is used to choose among the applicants.  For the Milwaukee program, a
comparison group can be constructed along these lines by including those who received vouchers but
could not find space in a participating school.  The studies that find higher scores for voucher students
than for the comparison group use this approach.  A critique of these studies, conducted by Rand
Corporation researchers, concludes that the results are not significant enough to inform the policy debate
surrounding vouchers.  One reason for their conclusion is that all evaluations looked at the program only
during its first few years of operation, when a one percent cap on vouchers was in place and an even
smaller percentage of students actually used vouchers to attend other schools.  The outcomes for this
handful of students may not be representative for the nearly 10,000 who went through the program in
2000-01.   
Privately funded voucher programs administered in four other cities – New York City, Charlotte,
Dayton, and Washington, D.C. – have also been evaluated using a methodology similar to the preferred
evaluations of the Milwaukee program.  These evaluations find little overall improvement in student tests
for those using vouchers.  They do, however, find modestly positive effects for African Americans.  This
positive result is consistent with the evidence on public-private school performance differentials, where
there is little or no difference on average, but positive differences for minorities, especially African
Americans, attending religious school in large urban areas.
Evaluations of the charter school movement have offered evidence that is  no more conclusive
than for vouchers.  Studies have looked at two issues.  First, they have considered whether or not students
who attend charter schools perform better on standardized tests than those who attend conventional
public schools.  This question considers whether charter schools – through more innovative curricula,
more specialized attention, or more dedicated and able teachers – are more effective in delivering
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educational services.  Studies that address this question try to control for differences in the ability,
motivation, and home support of students, as was attempted with the voucher evaluations. Second,
studies have considered whether the presence of charter schools in close proximity to conventional public
schools prompt public schools to be more innovative and responsive to students.  This question is
typically evaluated by examining the district level averages of test scores before and after nearby charter
schools have opened, compared with districts that did not experience the opening of charter schools.
Three studies, one for each of the three states in which charter schools are most prevalent, have
addressed the first question based upon the preferred approach of using individual student test scores. 
The studies for Texas and Arizona are able to follow students from one grade to the next.  Therefore,
they can look at the differences in test scores over time, which helps to control for differences in
characteristics of students attending charter schools and those attending conventional public schools. 
The Texas study, conducted by Gronberg and Jansen (2001), finds that conventional public schools
slightly outperformed charter schools, but that “at-risk” charter schools did marginally better than
conventional public schools.  The at-risk charter schools were specially-designated schools established
by the Texas legislature to target students with special circumstances, such as failing a number of
courses, low scores on the state standardized test, and unusual personal situations. The state was more
lenient in granting at-risk charters than regular charters.  Gronberg and Jansen also consider the length of
time that a charter school was in operation and found that student test scores improved as schools
matured, which suggests that over time charter schools may be a more viable alternative to conventional
public schools, to the extent that public schools are not prompted by competition to improve as well.    
A study of Arizona charter schools is more favorable to charter schools.  The evaluation team of
Solmon, Paark, and Garcia (2001) find that students in charter schools outperformed those in
conventional public schools on both math and reading tests.  As in Texas, students who changed from a
public school to a charter school did worse their first year than those who stayed in public schools, but
17The negative effect on student test scores is a well documented phenomenon.  Nelson and Hollenbeck
(2001) question whether it is reasonable to compare the group of students that moved from a charter school to a
conventio nal public sc hool to tho se that stayed in the  conventio nal public sc hool for bo th years.   
18Bettinger (1 999) an d Miro n and Ho rn (2000 ) also prov ide similar evid ence on M ichigan char ter school. 
19Eberts and Hollenbeck did not report results for African Americans alone.  It may be the case, as it was
with vouche r program s, that only African  American s benefitted fro m vouche rs and not o ther ethnic gro ups. 
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improved thereafter.17  Students spending two or three years in charter schools did better on math and
reading tests than students spending that time period in conventional public schools, although the reading
test gain was not large but still statistically significant.  
A Michigan study by Eberts and Hollenbeck (2001) finds that students in conventional public
schools outperformed those in charter schools on most of the standardized tests, which included math,
science, reading and writing.18  The analysis was limited to students in K-6 grade, since most of the
charter schools in the state concentrate on these grade levels.  As in the Texas study, relative test scores
in Michigan improved with the length of time a charter has been in operation.  Unlike the other two
studies, the Michigan study differentiates between charter schools that were operated by not-for-profit
organizations and those that were run by for-profit companies.  The distinction is important since one
might expect that organizations subject not only to the competition for students but also the competition
for investors’ money might be more innovative and efficient than those that are not subject to market
pressures.  However, students in for-profit charter schools performed worse than those in not-for-profit
charter schools, and students in either type of charter school performed worse than in conventional public
schools. The Michigan study also considers whether nonwhite students do better in charter schools than
conventional public schools, as found to some extent in the voucher programs, with no statistically
significant benefit to nonwhite students of attending charter schools.19
Hoxby (2001) has analyzed the second question regarding charter schools – whether their
competitive pressure improves public schools – in Michigan and Arizona.  Using what is referred to as a
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“difference-in-difference” control technique, she finds large and positive effects of charter schools on
public schools.  She reports that students in Michigan public schools that faced competition scored
upwards of 1.37 scale points higher after they began to face competition compared with those in schools
that did not face competition.  She found slightly higher results using another technique to detrend the
test scores.  Using the same techniques, she found similar results for Arizona.  It is interesting to note that
the improvement in conventional public schools came about in a relatively short period of time, typically
in no more than three to four years.  In this short time frame, it is conceivable that the teaching staff of
these schools stayed primarily the same and curriculum was not drastically changed, since such revisions
typically take several years particularly if new text books are required.  
Hoxby’s results point to the urgent need to open the “black box” of all these evaluations,
including vouchers, to examine what is happening inside the school building and classroom to bring
about these results, or in the case of vouchers, for the results not to change that much. What new course
have public schools subject to competition from charters in Michigan and Arizona taken to turn around
their programs and enhance the academic achievement of their students. Have unions played a significant
role in Michigan, a strong union state, in helping to devise the strategies to improve performance?  Does
the increase in performance of public schools, as shown by Hoxby’s results, account for the small
difference in the performance of charter schools and traditional public schools, and even in the
alternative schools participating in the voucher programs.  If so, then why have public schools, which
supposedly are burdened by stifling bureaucracies, been so quick to improve when the private schools or
charter schools have not? 
Without answers to these questions, it is difficult to assess the merits of the various reform
efforts.  Pay incentives have been shown to work, although on a very limited basis, but the problem is
that within a complex process such as the delivery of educational services, it is difficult to construct an
incentive structure that is sufficiently aligned with the various goals of education and that satisfies the
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various stakeholders.  Incentive pay mechanisms of the type proposed for public schools have rarely been
adopted in the private sector.  More promise lies in group incentive schemes, in that they are not only
more consistent with the complexity of educational process but also more attractive to teachers.   School
choice in the form of vouchers and charter schools has been highly touted by prominent thinkers and
researchers.  Yet, those programs in operation have not provided evidence convincing enough to
encourage widespread adoption of this approach, except possibly for their effects for African-Americans
in large urban areas or, indirectly, on conventional public schools.  
Current Reform Initiatives – NCLB
Where does the reform movement currently stand?  Looking to the federal government for clues
at that level of involvement in public education, one sees the current Bush administration embracing
several of the forms that we have discussed.   The No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB), which was enacted
in January 2002 as the reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA),
contained four principles of education reform, as proposed by the George W. Bush Administration. 
These are: 1) accountability for results, 2) state and local flexibility in using federal funds, 3) the use of
proven educational methods, and 4) expanded choice for parents.  As proposed and implemented, the
NCLB, appears consistent, or at least not inconsistent, with the best evidence we have on various
reforms.
The new law strengthens accountability for results in Federal education programs by requiring
states to set standards in reading and mathematics and to develop adequate yearly progress objectives that
will result in groups of students achieving proficiency within 12 years.  In addition, states must conduct
annual reading and math assessments for all students in grades 3-8 and states, school districts, and
schools must report annually on their progress in helping all groups of students to reach proficiency. 
School districts and schools that fail to achieve their annual adequate progress objectives will be subject
to corrective measures.  In addition, chronically failing schools must give students the option to transfer
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to a better school and to obtain supplemental educational services from public- or private-sector
providers.  Schools that meet or exceed their adequate yearly progress objectives will be eligible for State
Academic Achievement Awards.  
The fourth leg of the NCLB – expanding school choice – reinforces school accountability by
expanding the schooling options available to students and the means for parents to send their children to
these schools.  For example, if a school continues to fail to meet state standards, the law permits parents
to use Title I dollars to obtain supplemental educational services from other providers, including faith-
based organizations.  The NLCB also provides resources to expand and enhance charter schools.  A total
of $375 million was included in the President’s 2003 budget request for this purpose.  The NLCB also
provides funding to help conventional public schools develop and implement comprehensive reform
programs that are based on reliable research and effective practices.  The budget requests additional
funding for development of new technology, reduced class size, community learning centers, and teacher
development.    New Unionism
In recent years, both of the major teacher unions, the National Education Association and the
American Federation of Teachers, have pursued a new approach to collective bargaining.  Referred to as
the “new unionism,” this collaborative approach calls for greater teacher participation in the
determination of curriculum and instruction and more emphasis on improving student achievement.  In
launching these initiatives, presidents of both unions asserted the critical need to improve public schools
in order to preserve their unions.  To do this, the two presidents argue, unions must provide the
leadership to empower and enable teachers to be full partners in school reform.    
Unions have called for participation in the decision making process long before this current
movement began.  Analysis of union contracts in the late 1970s and early 1980s shows that teachers
represented by collective bargaining placed greater importance in participation in planning course
content than in student assignment or teacher assignment, and teacher collective bargaining contracts
20Black (2002 ) offers several of these critical points.
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contained provisions that allowed teachers to have a voice in decision making (Eberts and Stone, 1984).  
In most cases, participation was advisory and unions did not have final say on curriculum or instructional
matters that went beyond the working conditions of class size and time spent on instruction or
preparation.   
Therefore, the innovative aspect of the new unionism centers around ways to empower and
enable teachers.  The mission statement of the Teacher Union Reform Network, which was established in
1995 as a consortium of the NEA and AFT and several of its local affiliates to implement the new
unionism, brings the key issue surrounding the new approach into sharp focus.  It states that it is the
“union’s responsibility to collaborate with other stakeholders in public education and to seek consistently
higher levels of student achievement by seeking to expand the scope of collective bargaining to include
instructional and professional issues.”  Proponents argue that only by bringing teachers fully into the
process can successful school improvement be achieved; opponents claim that once shared decision
making is included in collective bargaining contracts, flexibility is lost, school improvement initiatives
are stifled, and soon attention shifts from what is right for the student to whether or not school
administrators have adhered to the contract.  Furthermore, once teachers have an opportunity to grieve
these issues, the educational policy of a school district ends up in the hands of a disinterested third party
arbitrator.20   
Two other issues appeal for close attention in considering the new unionism.  One is the simple
fact that we really know little about what works and what doesn’t work in the current reform movement. 
Obviously, there are various practices related to instruction and curriculum design that are better than
others.  But when it comes to more sweeping reform such as incentive pay or accountability systems, the
evidence is weak.  Codifying educational policy into the collective bargaining agreement without clear
evidence that it is effective can lead to both disappointment and wasted efforts.   Yet, it may be difficult
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to remove ineffective contract provisions if the provisions are seen by some stakeholders as protecting
their self interests – even if they do little or even impede the progress of the students they were designed
to serve. This problem leads to a second issue – accountability.  Those unions that are quick to ask for
participation in the reform process are typically not as eager for their members to be held accountable for
the outcomes of the process, specifically student outcomes.  If evaluations of the outcomes of the reform
movement show anything, it is that education is a risky business.  Outcomes are not certain, and many
factors contribute to a child’s educational achievement.  The new unionism is on its way to recognizing
that collective bargaining must be adapted to allow teachers to participate in a proactive attempt to find
new ways to educate the nation’s children.  At  the same time, with empowerment must come
responsibility, and only through systems of accountability in which risk is recognized and accepted can
real progress be made.  
IV.  Concluding Remarks
Teachers’ unions have taken some of the strongest criticism for both real and perceived
deficiencies of public schools, as well as for opposing a variety of reform initiatives.  Our review of the
evidence suggests that much of the criticism is misplaced.  It is not true that on average students fare
worse in unionized schools, all else the same.  If anything, average student performance on standardized
tests is slightly higher.  It is also not true that, all else the same, students on average fare worse in public
schools, whether unionized or not. 
Even so, teachers’ unions should not rest too comfortably, either.  While on average students fare
at least as well, if not better, in unionized schools,  atypical students – students well below or above
average ability – do appear to fare less well because instructional settings are more standardized, less
individualized in unionized schools.  Similarly, while students in general fare at least as well in public
schools as in private schools, minority students, especially African-American students, living in large
urban areas appear to fare better in private, especially private religious, schools. These findings should be
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near the top of the list of concerns for teachers’ unions, as well as for public schools in large urban areas
with concentrations of minority students.
Our review and analysis of various school reform efforts reveal few firm, reliable conclusions. 
What we don’t know about the true effectiveness of leading reform initiatives clearly outweighs what we
do know – whether the issue is school standards and accountability, merit-based incentive pay systems,
or charter schools and voucher plans.  That is not to say, however, that we don’t know anything.  There is
evidence, here and there, that in some cases a well designed, focused initiative may be effective.  As this
kind of positive evidence accumulates, one can hope that the expectations for “new unionism” or “reform
bargaining” will lead teachers’ unions to embrace, or at least accommodate, initiatives that work, whether
these turn out to be well designed systems of standards, school-based incentive plans, or even in limited 
cases focused plans for school choice that avoid further exacerbating segregation along the lines of
education, income, or race. 
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